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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider the problem of formally verifying the
safety of an autonomous robot equipped with a Neural Network
(NN) controller that processes LiDAR images to produce control
actions. Given a workspace that is characterized by a set of poly-
topic obstacles, our objective is to compute the set of safe initial
conditions such that a robot trajectory starting from these initial
conditions is guaranteed to avoid the obstacles. Our approach is to
construct a finite state abstraction of the system and use standard
reachability analysis over the finite state abstraction to compute the
set of the safe initial states. The first technical problem in computing
the finite state abstraction is to mathematically model the imaging
function that maps the robot position to the LiDAR image. To that
end, we introduce the notion of imaging-adapted sets as partitions
of the workspace in which the imaging function is guaranteed to be
affine. Based on this notion, and resting on efficient algorithms in
the literature of computational geometry, we develop a polynomial-
time algorithm to partition theworkspace into imaging-adapted sets
along with computing the corresponding affine imaging functions.
Given this workspace partitioning, a discrete-time linear dynamics
of the robot, and a pre-trained NN controller with Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) nonlinearity, the second technical challenge is to ana-
lyze the behavior of the neural network. To that end, and thanks
to the ReLU functions being piecewise linear functions, we utilize
a Satisfiability Modulo Convex (SMC) encoding to enumerate all
the possible segments of different ReLUs. SMC solvers then use a
Boolean satisfiability solver and a convex programming solver and
decompose the problem into smaller subproblems. At each iteration,
the Boolean satisfiability solver searches for a candidate assignment
for the different ReLU segments while completely abstracting the
robot dynamics. Convex programming is then used to check the
feasibility of the proposed ReLU phases against the dynamic and
imagining constraints, or generate succinct explanations for their
infeasibility to reduce the search space. To accelerate this process,
we develop a pre-processing algorithm that could rapidly prune
the space feasible ReLU segments. Finally, we demonstrate the ef-
ficiency of the proposed algorithms using numerical simulations
with increasing complexity of the neural network controller.
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1 INTRODUCTION
From simple logical constructs to complex deep neural network
models, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-agents are increasingly control-
ling physical/mechanical systems. Self-driving cars, drones, and
smart cities are just examples of such systems to name a few. How-
ever, regardless of the explosion in the use of AI within a multitude
of cyber-physical systems (CPS) domains, the safety and reliabil-
ity of these AI-enabled CPS is still an under-studied problem. It is
then unsurprising the failure of these AI-controlled CPS in several,
safety-critical, situations leading to human fatalities [1].
Motivated by the urgency to study the safety, reliability, and
potential problems that can rise and impact the society by the de-
ployment of AI-enabled systems in the real world, several works
in the literature focused on the problem of designing deep neural
networks that are robust to the so-called adversarial examples [2–8].
Unfortunately, these techniques focus mainly on the robustness
of the learning algorithm with respect to data outliers without
providing guarantees in terms of safety and reliability of the deci-
sions taken by these neural networks. To circumvent this drawback,
and motivated by the wealth of adversarial example generation
approaches for neural networks, recent works focused on three
main techniques namely (i) testing of neural networks, (ii) falsifica-
tion (semi-formal verification) of neural networks, and (iii) formal
verification of neural networks.
Representatives of the first class, namely testing of neural net-
works, are the work reported in [9–18] in which the neural network
is treated as a white box, and test cases are generated to maximize
different coverage criteria. Such coverage criteria include neuron
coverage, condition/decision coverage, and multi-granularity test-
ing criteria. On the one hand, maximizing test coverage give system
designers confidence that the networks are reasonably free from
defect. On the other hand, testing do not formally guarantee that a
neural network satisfy a formal specification.
Unfortunately, testing techniques focuses mainly on the neural
network as a component without taking into consideration the
effect of its decisions on the entire system behavior. This moti-
vated researchers to focus on falsification (or semi-formal verifica-
tion) of autonomous systems that include machine learning compo-
nents [19–21]. In such falsification frameworks, the objective is to
generate corner test cases that will lead the whole system to violate
a system-level specification. To that end, advanced 3D models and
image environments are used to bridge the gap between the virtual
world and the real world. By parametrizing the input to these 3D
models (e.g., position of objects, position of light sources, intensity
of light sources) and sampling the parameter space in a fashion
that maximizes the falsification of the safety property, falsification
frameworks can simulate several test cases until a counterexample
is found [19–21].
While testing and falsification frameworks are powerful tools
to find corner cases in which the neural network or the neural
network enabled system will fail, they lack the rigor promised by
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formal verification methods. Therefore, several researchers pointed
to the urgent need of using formal methods to verify the behavior
of neural networks and neural network enabled system [22–27]. As
a result, recent works in the literature attempted the problem of
applying formal verification techniques to neural network models.
Applying formal verification to neural network models comes
with its unique challenges. First and foremost is the lack of widely-
accepted, precise, mathematical specifications capturing the correct
behavior of a neural network. Therefore, recent works focused en-
tirely on verifying neural networks against simple input-output
specifications [28–33]. Such input-output techniques compute a
guaranteed range for the output of a deep neural network given
a set of inputs represented as a convex polyhedron. To that end,
several algorithms that takes advantage of the piecewise linear na-
ture of the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation functions (one of
the most famous nonlinear activation functions in deep neural net-
works) have been proposed. For example, by using binary variables
to encode piecewise linear functions, the constraints of ReLU func-
tions are encoded as a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP).
Combining output specifications that are expressed in terms of Lin-
ear Programming (LP), the verification problem eventually turns to
a MILP feasibility problem [32, 34].
Using off-the-shelf MILP solvers does not lead to a scalable ap-
proach to handle neural networks with hundreds and thousands of
neurons [29]. To circumvent this problem, several MILP-like solvers
targeted toward the neural network verification problem are pro-
posed. For example, the work reported in [28] proposed a modified
Simplex algorithm (originally used to solve linear programs) to
take into account ReLU nonlinearities as well. Similarly, the work
reported in [29] combines a Boolean satisfiability solving along
with a linear over-approximation of piecewise linear functions to
verify ReLU neural networks against convex specifications. Other
techniques that exploit specific geometric structures of the specifi-
cations are also proposed [35, 36]. A thorough survey on different
algorithms for verification of neural networks against input-output
range specifications can be found in [37] and the references within.
Unfortunately, the input-output range properties, studied so
far in the literature, are simplistic and fails to capture the safety
and reliability of cyber-physical systems when controlled by a
neural network. Therefore, in this paper, we focus instead on the
problem of formal verification of a neural network controlled robot
against system-level safety specifications. In particular, we consider
the problem in which a robot utilizes a LiDAR scanner to sense
its environment. The LiDAR image is then processed by a neural
network controller to compute the control inputs. Such scenario
is common in the literature of behavioral cloning and imitation
control in which the neural network is trained to imitate the actions
generated by experts controlling the robot [38]. With the objective
to verify the safety of these robots, we develop a framework that can
take into account the robot continuous dynamics, the workspace
configuration, the LiDAR imaging, and the neural network, and
compute the set of initial states for the robot that is guaranteed to
produce robot trajectories that are safe and collision free.
To carry out the prescribed formal verification problem, we need
a mathematical model that captures the LiDAR imaging process.
This is the process that generates the LiDAR images based on the
robot pose relative to the workspace objects. Therefore, the first
contribution of this paper is to introduce the notion of imaging-
adapted sets. These are workspace partitions within which the
map between robot pose and LiDAR images are mathematically
captured by an affine map. Given this notion, and thanks to the
advances in the literature of computational graphics, we develop a
polynomial-time algorithm that can partition the workspace into
imaging-adapted sets along with the corresponding affine maps.
Given the partitioned workspace along with a pre-trained neu-
ral network and the robot dynamics, we compute a finite state
abstraction of the closed loop system that enjoys a simulation re-
lation with the original system. The main challenge in computing
this finite state abstraction is to analyze the behavior of the neu-
ral network controller. Similar to previous works in the literature,
we strict our focus to neural networks with Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) nonlinearities and we develop a Satisfiability Modulo Con-
vex (SMC) programming algorithm that uses a combination of a
Boolean satisfiability solver and a convex programming solver to
iteratively reason about the neural network nonlinearity along with
the dynamics and the imaging constraints. At each iteration, the
boolean satisfiability solver searches for a candidate assignment de-
termining whether ReLU units are active while ignoring the neural
network weights, the robot dynamics, and the LiDAR imaging. The
convex programming solver is then used to check the feasibility of
the proposed ReLU assignment against the neural network weights,
the robot dynamics, and the LiDAR imaging. If the ReLU assignment
is deemed infeasible, then the SMC solver will generate succinct
explanations for their infeasibility to reduce the search space. To
accelerate the process, we develop a pre-processing algorithm that
can reduce the space of ReLU assignments.
Once the finite state abstraction is computed, we use standard
reachability analysis techniques to compute the set of safe initial
states. To summarize, the contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
1-A framework for formally proving safety properties of autonomous
robots controlled by neural network controllers that process LiDAR
images to compute control inputs.
2- A notion of imaging-adapted sets along with a polynomial-time
algorithm for partitioning the workspace into such sets while com-
puting an affine model capturing the LiDAR imaging process.
3- An SMC-based algorithm combined with an SMC-based pre-
processing for computing finite abstractions of the neural network
controlled autonomous robot.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1 Notation
The symbols N, R,R+ and B denote the set of natural, real, positive
real, and Boolean numbers, respectively. The symbols ∧,¬ and→
denote the logical AND, logical NOT, and logical IMPLIES operators,
respectively. Given two real-valued vectors x1 ∈ Rn1 and x2 ∈
Rn2 , we denote by (x1,x2) ∈ Rn1+n2 the column vector [xT1 ,xT2 ].
Similarly, for a vector x ∈ Rn , we denote by xi ∈ R the ith element
of x . For two vectors x1,x2 ∈ Rn , we denote by max(x1,x2) the
element-wise maximum. For a set S ⊂ Rn , we denote the boundary
and the interior of this set by ∂S and int(S), respectively. Given two
sets S1 and S2, f : S1 ⇒ S2 and f : S1 → S2 denote a set-valued and
2
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Figure 1: Pictorial representation of the problem setup un-
der consideration.
ordinary map, respectively. Finally, given a vector z = (x ,y) ∈ R2,
we denote by atan2(z) = atan2(y,x).
2.2 Dynamics and Workspace
We consider an autonomous robot moving in a 2-dimensional poly-
topic (compact and convex) workspace W ⊂ R2. We assume
that the robot must avoid the workspace boundaries ∂W along
with a set of obstacles {O1, . . . ,Oo }, with Oi ⊂ W which is as-
sumed to be polytopic. We denote by O the set of the obstacles
and the workspace boundaries which needs to be avoided, i.e.,
O = {∂W ,O1, . . . ,Oo }. The dynamics of the robot is described by
a discrete-time linear system of the form:
x (t+1) = Ax (t ) + Bu(t ), (1)
where x (t ) ∈ X ⊆ Rn is the state of robot at time t ∈ N and
u(t ) ⊆ Rm is the robot input. The matrices A and B represent the
robot dynamics and have appropriate dimensions. For a robot with
nonlinear dynamics that is either differentially flat or feedback
linearizable, the state space model (1) corresponds to its feedback
linearized dynamics. We denote by ζ (x) ∈ R2 the natural projection
of x onto the workspaceW, i.e., ζ (x (t )) is the position of the robot
at time t .
2.3 LiDAR Imaging
We consider the case when the autonomous robot uses a LiDAR
scanner to sense its environment. The LiDAR scanner emits a set
of N lasers evenly distributed in a 2π degree fan. We denote by
θ
(t )
lidar ∈ R the heading angle of the LiDAR at time t . Similarly,
we denote by θ (t )i = θ
(t )
lidar + (i − 1) 2πN , with i ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, the
angle of the ith laser beam at time t where θ (t )1 = θ
(t )
lidar and by
θ (t ) = (θ (t )1 , . . . ,θ
(t )
N ) the vector of the angles of all the laser beams.
While the heading angle of the LiDAR, θ (t )lidar, changes as the robot
poses changes over time, i.e.:
θ
(t )
lidar = f (x (t ))
for some nonlinear function f , in this paper we focus on the case
when the heading angle of the LiDAR, θ (t )lidar, is fixed over time and
we will drop the superscript t from the notation. Such condition
is satisfied in many real-world scenarios whenever the robot is
moving while maintaining a fixed pose (e.g. a Quadrotor whose
yaw angle is maintained constant).
For the ith laser beam, the observation signal ri (x (t )) ∈ R is
the distance measured between the robot position ζ (x (t )) and the
nearest obstacle in the θi direction, i.e.:
ri (x (t )) = minOi ∈O minz∈Oi ∥z − ζ (x
(t ))∥2
s.t. atan2(z − ζ (x (t ))) = θi . (2)
The final LiDAR image d(x (t )) ∈ R2N is generated by processing
the observations r (x (t )) as follows:
di (x (t )) =
(
ri (x (t )) cosθi , ri (x (t )) sinθi
)
,
d(x (t )) =
(
d1(x (t )), . . .dN (x (t ))
)
. (3)
2.4 Neural Network Controller
We consider a pre-trained neural network controller fNN : R2N →
Rm that processes the LiDAR images to produce control actions
with L internal and fully connected layers in addition to one output
layer. Each layer contains a set ofMl neurons (where l ∈ {1, . . . ,L})
with Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation functions. ReLU acti-
vation functions play an important role in the current advances in
deep neural networks [39]. For such neural network architecture,
the neural network controller u(t ) = fNN(d(x (t ))) can be written
as:
h1(t ) = max
(
0, W 0d(x (t )) +w0
)
,
h2(t ) = max
(
0, W 1h1(t ) +w1
)
,
...
hL(t ) =max
(
0, W L−1hL−1(t ) +wL−1
)
,
u(t ) =W LhL(t ) +wL , (4)
whereW l ∈ RMi×Ml−1 andwl ∈ RMl are the pre-trained weights
and bias vectors of the neural network which are determined during
the training phase.
2.5 Robot Trajectories and Safety Specifications
The trajectories of the robot whose dynamics are described by (1)
when controlled by the neural network controller (2)-(4) starting
from the initial condition x0 = x (0) is denoted by ηx0 : N → Rn
such that ηx0 (0) = x0. A trajectory ηx0 is said to be safe whenever
the robot position does not collide with any of the obstacles at all
times.
Definition 2.1 (Safe Trajectory). A robot trajectory ηx0 is called
safe if:
ζ (ηx0 (t)) < Oi ∀Oi ∈ O, ∀t ∈ N.
Using the previous definition, we now define the problem of
verifying the system-level safety of the neural network controlled
system as follows:
Problem 2.2. Consider the autonomous robot whose dynamics are
governed by (1) which is controlled by the neural network controller
described by (4) which processes LiDAR images described by (2)-(3).
Compute the set of safe initial conditions Xsafe ⊆ X such that any
trajectory ηx0 starting from x0 ∈ Xsafe is safe.
3
Partition the  
workspace into 
imaging-adapted 
sets
Use SMC to 
compute a finite 
state abstraction
1
2
11
3
12
46
unsafe
Hidden  
layer 1
Hidden  
layer 2
Output 
layer
Input 
layer
...<latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit> ...<latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA 92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUIzUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/ elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit>
...<latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUI zUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUI zUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUI zUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aob6yfo7DjevWJ/4C7HjbKaeLdU=">AAACyXicbVHLbhMxFHWGVwmvtizZjIiQWEUzCAmWFWyQkKpSkbRqZlTZnpvU1I/BvlOSWl7xA92Wf+CD+Bs86SClCVeydHzOubrHvqyWwmGW/ekld+7eu/9g62H/0eMnT59t7+yOnWkshxE30thjRh1IoWGEAiUc1xaoYhKO2PnHVj+6AOuE0V9xUUOp6EyLqeAUI zUuLiqD7nR7kA2zZaWbIO/AgHR1cLrT+11UhjcKNHJJnZvkWY2lpxYFlxD6ReOgpvyczmASoaYKXOmXcUP6KjJVOjU2Ho3pkl3t8FQ5t1AsOhXFM7euteT/tEmD0/elF7puEDS/GTRtZIombd+eVsICR7mIgHIrYtaUn1FLOcYf6hcWNPzgRimqK1/Y4AuEOS7jeQtVCOsWdsvCZAOtZ9VxGLwv2qCM+cOwru6vqPsb6smKehI2p0fJinmY5GVMAjOhPeuoQV5AdPy7hn5ccL6+zk0wfjPMs2H+5e1g70O36i3ygrwkr0lO3pE98okckBHh5Bu5ItfkV/I5+Z7Mk8sba9Lrep6TW5X8/At5z+gE</latexit>
Compute the 
predecessors of 
the unsafe states
1
2
11
3
12
46
Compute the 
set of safe states
unsafe
unsafe
unsafe
unsafe
Figure 2: Pictorial representation of the proposed framework.
3 FRAMEWORK
Before we describe the proposed framework, we need to briefly
recall the following set of definitions capturing the notion of a
system and relations between different systems.
Definition 3.1. An autonomous system S is a pair (X ,δ ) consist-
ing of a set of statesX and a set-valuedmap δ : X ⇒ X representing
the transition function. A system S is finite if X is finite. A system
S is deterministic if δ is single-valued map and is non-deterministic
if not deterministic.
Definition 3.2. Consider a deterministic system Sa = (Xa ,δa )
and a non-deterministic Sb = (Xb ,δb ). A relation Q ⊆ Xa × Xb is
a simulation relation from Sa to Sb , and we write Sa ≼Q Sb , if
the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) for every xa ∈ Xa there exists xb ∈ Xb with (xa ,xb ) ∈ Q ,
(2) for every (xa ,xb ) ∈ Q wehave thatx ′a = δa (xa ) in Sa implies
the existence of x ′b ∈ δb (xb ) in Sb satisfying (x ′a ,x ′b ) ∈ Q .
Using the previous two definitions, we describe our approach as
follows. As pictorially shown in Figure 2, given the autonomous
robot system SNN = (X,δNN), where δNN : x 7→ Ax + BfNN(d(x)),
our objective is to compute a finite state abstraction (possibly non-
deterministic) SF = (F ,δF) of SNN such that there exists a simu-
lation relation from SNN to SF , i.e., SNN ≼Q SF . This finite state
abstraction SF will be then used to check the safety specification.
The first difficulty in computing the finite state abstraction SF
is the nonlinearity in the relation between the robot position ζ (x)
and the LiDAR observations as captured by equation (2). However,
we notice that we can partition the workspace based on the laser
angles θ1, . . . ,θN along with the vertices of the polytopic obsta-
cles such that the map d (which maps the robot position to the
processed observations) is an affine map. Therefore, as summa-
rized in Algorithm 1, the first step is to compute such partitioning
W∗ of the workspace (WKSP-PARTITION, line 2 in Algorithm 1).
WhileWKSP-PARTITION focuses on partitioning the workspace
W, one need to partition the remainder of the state spaceX (STATE-
SPACE-PARTITION, line 5 in Algorithm 1) to compute the finite
set of abstract states F along with the simulation relation Q that
maps between states in X and the corresponding abstract states in
F , and vice versa.
Unfortunately, the number of partitions grows exponentially in
the number of lasers N and the number of vertices of the poly-
topic obstacles. To harness this exponential growth, we compute an
aggregate-partitioningW ′ using only few laser angles (called pri-
mary lasers and denoted byθp ). The resulting aggregate-partitioning
W ′ would contain a smaller number of partitions such that each
partition inW ′ represents multiple partitions inW. Similarly, we
can compute a corresponding aggregate set of states F ′ as:
s ′ = {s ∈ F | ∃x ∈ W ′, (x , s) ∈ Q}
Algorithm 1 Verify-NN(X,δNN)
1: Step 1: Partition the workspace
2: (W∗, W′) =WKSP-PARTITION(W, O, θp, θp )
3: Step 2: Compute the finite state abstraction SF
4: Step 2.1: Compute the states of SF
5: (F, F′, Q ) = STATE-SPACE-PARTITON(W∗, W′)
6: for each s and s′ in F do
7: δF .ADD-TRANSITION(s, s′)
8: Step 2.2: Pre-process the neural network
9: for each s and s′ in F do
10: Xs = {x ∈ X | (x, s) ∈ Q }
11: CEs = PRE-PROCESS(Xs , δNN)
12: Step 2.3: Compute the transition map δF
13: for each s in F and s′ in F′ where s < s′ do
14: Xs = {x ∈ X | (x, s) ∈ Q }
15: Xs′ = {x ∈ X | (x, s∗) ∈ Q, ∀s∗ ∈ s′ }
16: Status = CHECK-FEASIBILITY(Xs , Xs′, δNN, CEs )
17: if Status == INFEASIBLE then
18: for each s⋆ in s′ do
19: δF .REMOVE-TRANSITION(s, s⋆)
20: else
21: for each s⋆ in s′ do
22: Xs⋆ = {x ∈ X | (x, s∗) ∈ Q }
23: Status = CHECK-FEASIBILITY(Xs , Xs⋆, δNN, CEs )
24: if Status == INFEASIBLE then
25: δF .REMOVE-TRANSITION(s, s⋆)
26: Step 3: Compute the safe set
27: Step 3.1: Mark the abstract states corresponding to obstacles and
workspace boundary as unsafe
F0unsafe = {s ∈ F | ∃x ∈ X : (x, s) ∈ Q, ζ (x ) ∈ Oi , Oi ∈ O}
28: Step 3.2: Iteratively compute the predecessors of the abstract un-
safe states
29: Status = FIXED-POINT-NOT-REACHED
30: while Status == FIXED-POINT-NOT-REACHED do
31: Fkunsafe = Fk−1unsafe ∪ Pre(Fk−1unsafe)
32: if Fkunsafe == Fk−1unsafe then
33: Status = FIXED-POINT-REACHED
34: Fsafe = F \ Funsafe
35: Step 3.3: Compute the set of safe states
36: Xsafe = {x ∈ X | ∃s ∈ Fsafe : (x, s) ∈ Q }
37: Return Xsafe
where each aggregate state s ′ is a set representing multiple states
in F . Whenever possible, we will carry out our analysis using the
aggregated-partitioningW ′ (and F ′) and use the fine-partitioning
W only if deemed necessary. Details of the workspace partitioning
and computing the corresponding affine maps representing the
LiDAR imaging function are given in Section 4.
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The state transition map δF is computed as follows. First, we
assume a transition exists between any two states s and s ′ in F
(line 6- 7 in Algorithm 1). Next, we start eliminating unnecessary
transitions. We observe that regions in the workspace that are ad-
jacent or within some vicinity are more likely to force the need of
transitions between their corresponding abstract states. Similarly,
regions in the workspace that are far from each other are more
likely to prohibit transitions between their corresponding abstract
states. Therefore, in an attempt to reduce the number of compu-
tational steps in our algorithm, we check the transition feasibility
between a state s ∈ F and an aggregate state s ′ ∈ F ′. If our al-
gorithm (CHECK-FEASIBILITY) asserted that the neural network
δNN prohibits the robot from transitioning between the regions
corresponding to s and s ′ (denoted by Xs and Xs ′ , respectively),
then we conclude that no transition in δF is feasible between the
abstract state s and all the abstract states s⋆ in s ′ (lines 13-19 in
Algorithm 1). This leads to a reduction in the number of state pairs
that need to be checked for transition feasibility. Conversely, if our
algorithm (CHECK-FEASIBILITY) asserted that the neural network
δNN allows for a transition between the regions corresponding to
s and s ′, then we proceed by checking the transition feasibility
between the state s and all the states s∗ contained in the aggregate
state s∗ (lines 21-25 in Algorithm 1).
Checking the transition feasibility (CHECK-FEASIBILITY) be-
tween two abstract states entail reasoning about the robot dynamics,
the neural network, along with the affine map representing the Li-
DAR imaging computed from the previous workspace partitioning.
While the robot dynamics is assumed linear, the imaging function is
affine; the technical difficulty lies in reasoning about the behavior of
the neural network controller. Thanks to the ReLU activation func-
tions in the neural network, we can encode the problem of checking
the transition feasibility between two regions as formula φ, called
monotone Satisfiability Modulo Convex (SMC) formula [40, 41],
over Boolean and convex constraints representing, respectively, the
ReLU phases and the dynamics, the neural network weights, and
the imaging constraints. In addition to using SMC solver to check
the transition feasibility (CHECK-FEASIBILITY) between abstract
states, it will be used also to perform some pre-processing of the
neural network function δNN (lines 9-11 in Algorithm 1) which
is going to speed up the process of checking the the transition
feasibility. Details of the SMC encoding are given in Section 5.
Once the finite state abstraction SF and the simulation relation
Q is computed, the next step is to partition the finite states F into
a set of unsafe states Funsafe and a set of safe states Funsafe using
the following fixed-point computation:
F kunsafe =

{s ∈ F | ∃x ∈ X : (x , s) ∈ Q,
ζ (x) ∈ Oi ,Oi ∈ O} k = 0
F k−1unsafe ∪ Pre(F k−1unsafe) k > 0
Funsafe = lim
k→∞
F kunsafe
Fsafe = F \ Funsafe.
where the F 0unsafe represents the abstract state corresponding to
the obstacles and workspace boundaries while F kunsafe with k > 0
represents all the states that can reach F 0unsafe in k-steps where:
Pre(s) = {s ′ ∈ F | s ∈ δF(s ′)}.
The remaining abstract states are then marked as the set of safe
states Fsafe. Finally, we can compute the set of safe states Xsafe as:
Xsafe = {x ∈ X | ∃s ∈ Fsafe : (x , s) ∈ Q}.
These computations are summarized in lines 27-36 in Algorithm 1.
4 IMAGING-ADAPTEDWORKSPACE
PARTITIONING
We start by introducing the notation of the important geometric
objects. We denote by Ray(w,θ ) the ray originated from a point
w ∈ W in the direction θ , i.e.:
Ray(w,θ ) = {w ′ ∈ W | atan2(w ′ −w) = θ }.
Similarly, we denote by Line(w1,w2) the line segment between the
pointsw1 andw2, i.e.:
Line(w1,w2) = {w ′ ∈ W | w ′ = νw1 + (1 − ν )w2, 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1}.
For a convex polytope P ⊆ W, we denote by Vert(P), its set of
vertices and by Edge(P) its set of line segments representing the
edges of the polyhedron.
4.1 Imaging-Adapted Partitions
The basic idea behind our algorithm is to partition the workspace
into a set of polytypic sets (or regions) such that for each region R
the LiDAR rays will intersect the same obstacle/workspace edge
regardless of the robot positions ζ (x) ∈ R. To formally characterize
this property, let O⋆ = ⋃Oi ∈O Oi be the set of all points z in the
workspace in which an obstacle or workspace boundary exists. Con-
sider a workspace partition R ⊆ W and a robot position ζ (x) that
lies inside this partition, i.e., ζ (x) ∈ R. The intersection between
the kth LiDAR laser beam Ray(ζ (x),θk ) and O⋆ is a unique point
characterized as:
zk,ζ (x )(R) = arg minz∈W ∥z − ζ (x)∥2 s.t. z ∈ Ray(ζ (x),θk ) ∩ O
⋆.
(5)
By sweeping ζ (x) across the whole region R, we can characterize
the set of all possible intersection points as:
Lk (R) =
⋃
ζ (x )∈R
zk,ζ (x )(R). (6)
Using the set Lk (R) described above, we define the notion of
imaging-adapted set as follows.
Definition 4.1. A set R ⊂ W is said to be an imaging-adapted
partition if the following property holds:
Lk (R) is a line segment ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,N }. (7)
Figure 3 shows concrete examples of imaging-adapted partitions.
Imaging-adapted partitions enjoys the following property:
Lemma 4.2. Consider an imaging-adapted partition R with cor-
responding sets L1(R), . . . ,LN (R). The LiDAR imaging function
d : R → R2N is an affine function of the form:
dk (ζ (x)) = Pk,Rζ (x) +Qk,R , d = (d1, . . . ,dN ) (8)
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Figure 3: (left) A partitioning of the workspace that is not
imaging-adapted. Within region R1, the LiDAR ray (cyan ar-
row) intersects different obstacles edges depending on the
robot position. (right) A partitioning of the workspace that
is imaging-adapted. For both regions R1 and R2, the LiDAR
ray (cyan arrow) intersects the same obstacle edge regardless
of the robot position.
for some constant matrices Pk,R and vectorsQk,R that depend on the
region R and the LiDAR angle θk .
4.2 Partitioning the Workspace
Motivated by Lemma 4.2, our objective is to design an algorithm
that can partition the workspaceW into a set of imaging-adapted
partitios. As summarized in Algorithm 2, our algorithm starts by
computing a set of line segments G that will be used to partition
the workspace (lines 1-5 in Algorithm 2). This set of line segments
G are computed as follows. First, we define the setV as the one
that contains all the vertices of the workspace and the obstacles, i.e.,
V = ⋃Oi ∈O Vert(Oi ). Next, we consider rays originating from
all the vertices inV and pointing in the opposite direction of the
angles θ1, . . . ,θN . By intersecting these rays with the obstacles and
picking the closest intersection points, we acquire the line segments
G that will be used to partition the workspace. In other words, G
is computed as:
Gk = {Line(v, z) | v ∈ V, z = arg min
z∈Ray(v,θk+π )∩O⋆
∥z −v ∥2}
G =
N⋃
k=1
Gk (9)
Thanks to the fact that the vertices v are fixed, finding the inter-
section between Ray(v,θk + π ) and O⋆ is a standard ray-polytope
intersection problem which can be solved efficiently [42].
The next step is to compute the intersection pointsP between the
line segmentsG and the edges of the obstaclesE = ⋃Oi ∈O Edge(Oi ).
A naive approach will be to consider all combinations of line seg-
ments in G ∪ E and test them for intersection. Such approach is
combinatorial and would lead to an execution time that is exponen-
tial in the number of laser angles and vertices of obstacles. Thanks to
the advancements in the literature of computational geometry, such
intersection points can be computed efficiently using the Plane-
Sweep algorithm [42]. The plane-sweep algorithm simulates the
process of sweeping a line downwards over the plane. The order
of the line segments G ∪ E from left to right as they intersect the
sweep line is stored in a data structure called the sweep-line status.
Only segments that are adjacent in the horizontal ordering need
to be tested for intersection. Though the sweeping process can be
visualized as continuous, the plane-sweep algorithm sweeps only
the values in which the endpoints of segments in G ∪ E, which are
given beforehand, and the intersection points, which are computed
on the fly. To keep track of the endpoints of segments in G ∪ E
and the intersection points, we use a balanced binary search tree
as data structure to support insertion, deletion, and searching in
O(loд n) time, where n is number of elements in the data structure.
The final step is to use the line segments G∪E and their intersec-
tion points P, discovered by the plane-sweep algorithm, to compute
the workspace partitions. To that end, consider the undirected pla-
nar graph whose vertices are the intersection points P and whose
edges are G ∪ E, denoted by Graph(P,G ∪ E). The workspace
partitions are equivalent to finding subgraphs of Graph(P,G ∪ E)
such that each subgraph contains only one simple cycle 1. To find
these simple cycles, we use a modified Depth-First-Search algo-
rithm in which it starts from a vertex in the planar graph and then
traverses the graph by considering the rightmost turns along the
vertices of the graph. Finally, the workspace partition is computed
as the convex hull of all the vertices in the computed simple cycles.
It follows directly from the fact that each region is constructed from
the vertices of a simple cycle that there exists no line segment in
G ∪ E that intersects with the interior of any region, i.e., for any
workspace partition R, the following holds:
int(R) ∩ e = ∅ ∀e ∈ G ∪ E (10)
This process is summarized in lines 8-16 in Algorithm 2. An impor-
tant property of the regions determined by Algorithm 2 is stated
by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Consider a partitionR computed by Algorithm 2
and satisfies (10). The following property holds for any LiDAR ray
with angle θk :
∃e ∈ E : Lk (R) ⊆ e
where Lk (R) defined in (6). In other words, the LiDAR ray with angle
θk intersects the same obstacle edge regardless of the robot position.
We conclude this section by stating our first main result, quanti-
fying the correctness and complexity of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4.4. Given a workspace with polytopic obstacles and a set
of laser angles θ1, . . . ,θN , then Algorithm 2 computes the partitioning
R1, . . . ,Rr such that:
(1) W = ⋃ri=1 Ri ,
(2) Ri is an imaging-adapted partition ∀i = 1, . . . , r ,
(3) d : Ri → R2N is affine ∀i = 1, . . . , r .
Moreover, the time complexity of Algorithm 2 isO(M log M+I log M),
whereM = |G ∪ E| is cardinality of G ∪ E, and I is number of inter-
section points between segments in E ∪ E.
5 COMPUTING THE FINITE STATE
ABSTRACTION
Once the workspace is partitioned into imaging-adapted regions
W⋆ = {R1, . . . ,Rr } and the corresponding imaging function is
identified, the next step is to compute the finite state transition
abstraction SF = (F ,δF) of the closed loop system along with
the simulation relation Q . The first step is to define the state space
F and its relation to X. To that end, we start by computing a
1A cycle in an undirected graph is called simple when no repetitions of vertices and
edges is allowed within the cycle.
6
Algorithm 2WKSP-PARTITION (W,O,θ ,θp )
1: Step 1: Generate partition segments
2: O⋆ = ⋃Oi ∈O Oi , V = ⋃Oi ∈O Vert(Oi ), E = ⋃Oi ∈O Edge(Oi )
3: for k ∈ {1, . . . , N } do
4: Use a ray-polygon intersection algorithm to compute:
Gk = {Line(v, z) | v ∈ V, z = arg min
z∈Ray(v,θk+π )∩O⋆
∥z − v ∥2 }
5: G = ⋃k∈θ Gk , G′ = ⋃k∈θp Gk
6: Step 2: Compute intersection points
7: P = PLANE-SWEEP(G ∪ E), P′ = PLANE-SWEEP(G′ ∪ E)
8: Step 3: Construct the partitions
9: Cycles = Find-Vertices-Of-Simple-Cycle(Graph(P, G ∪ E))
10: Cycles’ = Find-Vertices-Of-Simple-Cycle (Graph(P′, G′ ∪ E)).
11: for c ∈ Cycles do
12: R = Convex-Hull(c)
13: W⋆ .ADD(R)
14: for c ∈ Cycles′ do
15: R′ = Convex-Hull(c)
16: W′.ADD(R′)
17: Return W⋆, W′
partitioning of the state space X that respectsW⋆. For the sake
of simplicity, we consider X ⊂ Rn that is n-orthotope, i.e., there
exists constants x i ,x i ∈ R, i = 1, . . . ,n such that:
X = {x ∈ Rn | x i ≤ xi < x i , i = 1, . . . ,n}
Now, given a discretization parameter ϵ ∈ R+, we define the state
space F as:
F = {(k1,k3, . . . ,kn ) ∈ Nn−1 | 1 ≤ k1 ≤ r ,
1 ≤ ki ≤
x i − x i
ϵ
, i = 3, . . . ,n} (11)
where r is the number of regions in the partitioningW⋆. In other
words, the parameter ϵ is used to partition the state space into ϵ
hyper-cubes. A state s ∈ F represents the index of a region inW⋆
followed by the indices identifying a hypercube in the remaining
n−2 dimensions. Note that for the simplicity of notation, we assume
that x i − x i is divisible by ϵ for all i = 1, . . . ,n. We now define the
relation Q ⊆ X × F as:
Q = {(x , s) ∈ X × F | s = (k1,k3, . . . ,kn ),x = (ζ (x),x3, . . . ,xn ),
ζ (x) ∈ Rk1 ,x i + ϵ(ki − 1) ≤ xi < x i + ϵki ,
i = 3, . . . ,n}. (12)
Finally, we define the state transition function δF of SF as fol-
lows:
(k ′1,k ′3, . . .k ′n ) ∈ δF((k1,k3, . . .kn )) if
∃x = (ζ (x),x3, . . . ,xn ) ∈ Rk1 ,x i + ϵ(ki − 1) ≤ xi < x i + ϵki ,
x ′ = (ζ (x ′),x ′3, . . . ,x ′n ) ∈ Rk ′1 ,x i + ϵ(k
′
i − 1) ≤ x ′i < x i + ϵk ′i ,
s.t. x ′ = Ax + BfNN (d(x)). (13)
It follows from the definition of δF in (13) that checking the transi-
tion feasibility between two states s and s ′ is equivalent to searching
for a robot initial and goal states along with a LiDAR image that
will force the neural network controller to generate an input that
moves the robot between the two states while respecting the robots
dynamics. In the reminder of this section, we focus on solving this
feasibility problem.
5.1 SMC Encoding of NN
We translate the problem of checking the transition feasibility in δF
into a feasibility problem over a monotone SMC formula [40, 41]
as follows. We introduce the Boolean indicator variables blj with
l = 1, . . . ,L and j = 1, . . . ,Ml (recall that L represents the number
of layers in the neural network, whileMl represents the number of
neurons in the lth layer). These Boolean variables represents the
phase of each ReLU, i.e., an asserted blj indicates that the output of
the jth ReLU in the lth layer is hlj = (W l−1hl−1 +wl−1)j while a
negated blj indicates that h
l
j = 0. Using these Boolean indicator vari-
ables, we encode the problem of checking the transition feasibility
between two states s = (k1,k3, . . . ,kn ) and s ′ = (k ′1,k ′3, . . . ,k ′n ) as:
∃ x ,x ′ ∈ Rn ,u ∈ Rm ,d ∈ R2N , (14)
(bl ,hl , t l ) ∈ BMl × RMl × RMl , l ∈ {1, . . . ,L}
subject to:
ζ (x) ∈ Rk1 ∧ x i + ϵ(ki − 1) ≤ xi < x i + ϵki , i = 3, . . . ,n (15)
∧ζ (x ′) ∈ Rk ′1 ∧ x i + ϵ(k
′
i − 1) ≤ x ′i < x i + ϵk ′i , i = 3, . . . ,n (16)
∧ x ′ = Ax + Bu (17)
∧ dk = Pk,Rk1 ζ (x) +Qk,Rk1 , k = 1, . . . ,N (18)
∧
(
t1 =W 0d +w0
)
∧
( L∧
l=2
t l =W l−1hl−1 +wl
)
(19)
∧
(
u =W LhL +wL
)
(20)
∧
L∧
l=1
Mj∧
j=1
blj →
[(
hlj = t
l
j
)
∧
(
t lj ≥ 0
)]
(21)
∧
L∧
l=1
Mj∧
j=1
¬blj →
[(
hlj = 0
)
∧
(
t lj < 0
)]
(22)
where (15)-(16) encodes the state space partitions corresponding
to the states s and s ′; (17) encodes the dynamics of the robot; (18)
encodes the imaging function that maps the robot position into
LiDAR image; (19)-(22) encodes the neural network controller that
maps the LiDAR image into a control input.
Compared to Mixed-Integer Linear Programs (MILP), monotone
SMC formulas avoid using encoding heuristics like big-M encodings
which leads to numerical instabilities. SMC decision procedures fol-
low an iterative approach combining efficient Boolean Satisfiability
(SAT) solving with numerical convex programming. When applied
to the encoding above, at each iteration the SAT solver generates
a candidate assignment for the ReLU indicator variables blj . The
correctness of these assignments are then checked by solving the
corresponding set of convex constraints. If the convex program
turned to be infeasible, indicating a wrong choice of the ReLU
indicator variables, the SMC solver will identify the set of “Irre-
ducible Infeasible Set” (IIS) in the convex program to provide the
most succinct explanation of the conflict. This IIS will be then fed
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back to the SAT solver to prune its search space and provide the
next assignment for the ReLU indicator variables. SMC solvers was
shown to better handle problems (compared with MILP solvers) for
problems with relatively large number of Boolean variables [41].
5.2 Pruning Search Space By Pre-processing
While a neural network withM ReLUs would give rise to 2M com-
binations of possible assignments to the corresponding Boolean
indicator variables, we observe that several of those combinations
are infeasible for each workspace region. In other words, the Li-
DAR imaging function along with the workspace region enforces
some constraints on the inputs to the neural network which in
turn enforces constraints on the subsequent layers. By performing
pre-processing on each of the workspace regions, we can discover
those constraints and augment it to the SMC encoding (15)-(22) to
prune several combinations of assignments of the ReLU indicator
variables.
To find such constraints, we consider an SMC problem with the
fewer constraints (15), (18)-(22). By iteratively solving the reduced
SMC problem and recording all the IIS conflicts produced by the
SMC solver, we can compute a set of counter-examples that are
unique for each region. By iteratively invoking the SMC solver
while adding previous counter-examples as constraints until the
problem is no longer satisfiable, we compute the set R-Conflicts
which represents all the counter-examples for region R. Finally, we
add the following constraint: ∧
c ∈R-Conflicts
c (23)
to the original SMC encoding (15)-(22) to prune the set of possible
assignments to the ReLU indicator variables. In Section 6, we show
that pre-processing would result in an order of magnitude reduction
in the execution time.
5.3 Correctness of Algorithm 1
We end our discussion with the following results which asserts the
correctness of the whole framework described in this paper. We
first start by establishing the correctness of computing the finite
abstraction SF along with the simulation relation Q as follows:
Proposition 5.1. Consider the finite state system SF = (F ,δF)
where F is defined by (11) and δF is defined by (13) and computed
by means of solving the SMC formula (15)-(23). Consider also the
system SNN = (X,δNN) where δNN = x 7→ Ax + BfNN(d(x)). For the
relation Q defined in (12), the following holds: SNN ≼Q SF .
Recall that Algorithm 1 applies standard reachability analysis
on SF to compute the set of unsafe states. It follows directly from
the correctness of the simulation relation Q established above that
our algorithm computes an over-approximation of the set of unsafe
states, and accordingly an under-approximation of the set of safe
states. This fact is captured by the following result that summarizes
the correctness of the proposed framework:
Theorem 5.2. Consider the safe setXsafe computed by Algorithm 1.
Then any trajectory ηx with ηx (0) ∈ Xsafe is a safe trajectory.
While Theorem 5.2 establishes the correctness of the proposed
framework in Algorithm 1, two points needs to be investigated
Table 1: Scalability results for theWKSP-PARTITION Algo-
rithm
Number of Number of Number of Time
Vertices Lasers regions [s]
8 111 0.0152
8 38 1851 0.3479
118 17237 5.5300
8 136 0.0245
10 38 2254 0.4710
118 20343 6.9380
8 137 0.0275
38 2418 0.5362
12 120 23347 8.0836
218 76337 37.0572
298 142487 86.6341
namely (i) complexity of Algorithm 1 and (ii) maximality of the
set Xsafe. Although Algorithm 2 computes the imaging-adapted
partitions efficiently (as shown in Theorem 4.4), analyzing a neural
network with ReLU activation functions is shown to be NP-hard.
Exacerbating the problem, Algorithm 1 entails analyzing the neural
network a number of times that is exponential in the number of
partition regions. In Section 6, we experiment the efficiency of using
SMC decision procedures to harness this computational complexity.
As for the maximality of the computed Xsafe set, we note that
Algorithm 1 is not guaranteed to search for the maximal Xsafe.
6 RESULTS
We implemented the proposed verification framework as described
by Algorithm 1 on top of the SMC solver named SATEX [43]. All
experiments were executed on an Intel Core i7 2.5-GHz processor
with 16 GB of memory.
6.1 Scalability of the Workspace Partitioning
Algorithm:
As the first step of our verification framework, imaging-adapted
workspace partitioning is tested for numerical stability with in-
creasing number of laser angles and obstacles. Table 1 summarizes
the scalability results in terms of the number of computed regions
and the execution time grows as the number of LiDAR lasers and
obstacle vertices increase. Thanks to adopting well-studied com-
putational geometry algorithms, our partitioning process takes
less than 1.5 minutes for the scenario where a LiDAR scanner is
equipped with 298 lasers (real-world LiDAR scanners are capable
of providing readings from 270 laser angles).
6.2 Computational Reduction Due to
Pre-processing
The second step is to pre-process the neural network. In particular,
we would like to answer the following question: given a partitioned
workspace, howmany ReLU assignments are feasible in each region,
and if any, what is the execution time to find them out. Recall that
a ReLU assignment is feasible if there exist a robot position and the
corresponding LiDAR image that will lead to that particular ReLU
assignment.
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Thanks to the IIS counterexample strategy, we can find all feasi-
ble ReLU assignments in pre-processing. Our first observation is
that the number of feasible assignments is indeed much smaller
compared to the set of all possible assignments. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, for a neural network with a total of 32 neurons, only 11 ReLU
assignments are feasible (within the region under consideration).
Comparing this number to 232 = 4.3E9 possibilities of ReLU assign-
ments, we conclude that pre-processing is very effective in reducing
the search space by several orders of magnitude.
Furthermore, we conducted an experiment to study the scala-
bility of the proposed pre-processing for an increasing number
of ReLUs. To that end, we fixed one choice of workspace regions
while changing the neural network architecture. The execution
time, the number of generated counterexamples, along with the
number of feasible ReLU assignments are given in Table 2. For the
case of neural networks with one hidden layer, our implementa-
tion of the counterexample strategy is able to find feasible ReLU
assignments for a couple of hundreds of neurons in less than 4
minutes. In general, the number of counterexamples, and hence
feasible ReLU assignments, and execution time grows with the
number of neurons. However, the number of neurons is not the
only deciding factor. Our experiments show that the depth of the
network plays a significant role in affecting the scalability of the
proposed algorithms. For example, comparing the neural network
with one hidden layer and a hundred neurons per layer versus the
network with two layers and fifty neurons per layer we notice that
both networks share the same number of neurons. Nevertheless,
the deeper network resulted in one order of magnitude increase
regarding the number of generated counterexamples and one order
of magnitude increase in the corresponding execution time. Inter-
estingly, both of the architectures share a similar number of feasible
ReLU assignments. In other words, similar features of the neural
network can be captured by fewer counterexamples whenever the
neural network has fewer layers. This observation can be accounted
for the fact that counterexamples that correspond to ReLUs in early
layers are more powerful than those involves ReLUs in the later
layers of the network.
In the second part of this experiment, we study the dependence
of the number of feasible ReLU assignments on the choice of the
workspace region. To that end, we fix the architecture of the neural
network to one with 2 hidden layers and 40 neurons per layer. Ta-
ble 3 reports the execution time, the number of counterexamples,
and the number of feasible ReLU assignments across different re-
gions of the workspace. In general, we observe that the number of
feasible ReLU assignments increases with the size of the region.
6.3 Transition Feasibility
Following our verification streamline, the next step is to compute
the transition function of the finite-state abstraction δF , i.e., check
transition feasibility between regions. Table 4 shows performance
comparison between our proposed strategy that uses counterexam-
ples obtained from pre-processing and SMC encoding without pre-
processing. We observe that SMC encodings empowered by coun-
terexamples, generated through the pre-processing phase, scales
more favorably compared to the ones that do not take counterex-
amples into account leading to 2-3 orders of magnitude reduction
Table 2: Execution time of the SMC-based pre-processing as
a function of the neural network architecture.
Number Total Number of Number of Time
of Hidden Number feasibile Counter [s]
Layers of Neurons ReLU Assignments Examples
32 11 60 2.7819
72 31 183 11.4227
92 58 265 18.4807
102 68 364 43.2459
152 101 540 78.3015
172 146 778 104.4720
202 191 897 227.2357
1 302 383 1761 656.3668
402 730 2614 1276.4405
452 816 4325 1856.0418
502 1013 3766 2052.0574
552 1165 4273 4567.1767
602 1273 5742 6314.4890
652 1402 5707 7166.3059
702 1722 6521 8813.1829
22 3 94 1.3180
42 19 481 10.9823
62 35 1692 53.2246
82 33 2685 108.2584
2 102 58 5629 292.7412
122 71 9995 739.4883
142 72 18209 2098.0220
162 98 34431 6622.1830
182 152 44773 12532.8552
32 5 319 5.7227
3 47 7 5506 148.8727
62 45 72051 12619.5353
4 22 9 205 10.4667
42 5 1328 90.1148
Table 3: Execution time of the SMC-based pre-processing as
a function of the workspace region.
Region Number of Number of Time
Index feasibile Counter [s]
ReLU Assignments Examples
A2-R3 33 2685 108.2584
A14-R1 55 4925 215.8251
A13-R3 7 1686 69.4158
A1-R1 25 2355 99.2122
A7-R1 26 3495 139.3486
A12-R2 3 1348 54.4548
A15-R3 25 3095 121.7869
A19-R1 38 4340 186.6428
in the execution time. Moreover, and thanks to the pre-processing
counter-examples, we observe that checking transition feasibility
becomes less sensitive to changes in the neural network architec-
ture as shown in Table 4.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Wepresented a framework to verify the safety of autonomous robots
equipped with LiDAR scanners and controlled by neural network
controllers. Thanks to the notion of imaging-adapted sets, we can
partition the workspace to render the problem amenable to formal
verification. Using SMC-encodings, we presented a framework to
compute finite-state abstraction of the system that can be used to
compute an under-approximation of the set of safe robot states. We
demonstrated a pre-processing technique that generates a set of
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Table 4: Performance of the SMC-based encoding for com-
puting δF as a function of the neural network (timeout = 1
hour/)
Number of Total Number Time [s] Time [s]
Hidden Layers of Neurons (Exploit Counter (Without Counter
Examples) Examples)
82 0.5056 50.1263
102 7.1525 timeout
1 112 12.524 timeout
122 18.0689 timeout
132 20.4095 timeout
22 0.1056 15.8841
42 4.8518 timeout
62 3.1510 timeout
82 2.6112 timeout
2 102 11.0984 timeout
122 3.8860 timeout
142 0.7608 timeout
162 2.7917 timeout
182 193.6693 timeout
32 0.3884 388.549
3 47 0.9034 timeout
62 59.393 timeout
counterexamples which resulted in 2-3 orders of magnitude exe-
cution time reduction. Future work includes investigating further
strategies for efficient generation of pre-processing counterexam-
ples along with extending the proposed technique to account to
uncertainties in the LiDAR scanner.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
Proof. Consider an arbitrary LiDAR laser with an angle θk and
arbitrary robot position ζ (x) ∈ R. The LiDAR image dk can be
written as:
dk = zk,ζ (x )(R) − ζ (x) (24)
where zk,ζ (x )(R) is defined in (5). It follows from the fact that
R is an imaging-adapted partition that the set Lk (R) is a line
segment. Let ak ,bk ∈ R2 be the vertices of this line segment,
i.e., (ak ,bk ) = Vert(Lk (R)) and recall that zk,ζ (x )(R) satisfies
zk,ζ (x )(R) ∈ Lk (R) and hence zk,ζ (x )(R) lies on the line segment
Line(ak ,bk ). Therefore there exists a νk such that:
zk,ζ (x )(R) = (1 − νk )ak + νbk (25)
where 0 ≤ νk ≤ 1. It follows from the definition of zk,ζ (x )(R) in (5)
that zk,ζ (x )(R) also lies on Ray(ζ (x),θk ) and hence:
tan(θk ) =
z2 − x2
z1 − x1 , (26)
where (z1, z2) are the two elements of zk,ζ (x )(R) ∈ R ⊂ R2 while
(x1,x2) are the corresponding two elements of ζ (x) ∈ R ⊂ R2.
Substituting (25) in (26) yields:
tan(θk ) =
(1 − νk )a2 + νkb2 − x2
(1 − νk )a1 + νka2 − x1
(27)
where (a1,a2) = ak and (b1,b2) = bk are the two elements of ak
and bk , respectively. By solving (27) for νk , we conclude that:
νk = Aνk ζ (x) + bνk , (28)
Aνk =

[
1
b2−a2 0
]
θk = π/2 or 3π/2[
tan(θk )
a2−b2+(b1−a1) tan(θk )−a2
1
a2−b2+(b1−a1) tan(θk )
]
otherwise,
bνk =
{
0 θk = π/2 or 3π/2
a2−a2 tan(θk )
a2−b2+(b1−a1) tan(θk ) otherwise,
where Aνk and bνk are constants that depends on the values of the
constants ak ,bk , and θk . From (24),(25), and (28), we conclude that:
dk (ζ (x)) = Pk,Rζ (x) +Qk,R (29)
with Pk,R = (bk − ak )(A − I ) (where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix)
andQk,R = ak +bνk (bk −ak ) are constants that depends on ak ,bk
and θk form which we conclude that dk (ζ (x)) is affine. Note that
we added the subscript R to Pk,R and Qk,R to emphasize the face
that these constant matrices depends on the region R. Since we
picked k arbitrary, we finally conclude that d(ζ (x)) is also an affine
function. □
B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3
Proof. We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there ex-
ists two obstacle edge Line(v1,v2), Line(w1,w2) ∈ E with (v1,v2) ,
(w1,w2) along with rays originating from points p1,p2 ∈ R such
that the intersection points:
z1 = arg min
z1∈Ray(p1,θk )∩O⋆
∥z1 − p1∥
z2 = arg min
z2∈Ray(p2,θk )∩O⋆
∥z2 − p2∥.
satisfy z1 ∈ Line(v1,v2) and z2 ∈ Line(w1,w2).
Now consider the set P1 defined as follows:
P1 = {p ∈ R | p ∈ Ray(z,θk + π ), ∀z ∈ Line(v1,v2)}
It follows from the definition of z1 that p1 ∈ P1. It also follows
from the definition of P1 that P1 ⊆ R. Moreover, it follows from the
definition of the set E along with the fact that Line(v1,v2) ∈ E that
v1 and v2 satisfy v1,v2 ∈ V . It follows from the definition of the
set G in (9) that it contains line segments from the rays originated
at elements of the set V . Hence, there exists v ′1,v ′′1 ,v ′2,v ′′2 such
that the line segments Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) and Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) satisfy:
Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) ⊂ Ray(v1,θk + π ) ⊂ P1 ⊆ R, Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) ∈ G
(30)
Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) ⊂ Ray(v2,θk + π ) ⊂ P1 ⊆ R, Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) ∈ G
(31)
However, it follows from (10) that line segments that are elements
of G do not intersect the interior of R. Hence:
Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) ⊂ R
Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) ∩ int(R) = ∅
}
⇒ Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) ⊂ ∂R (32)
Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) ⊂ R
Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) ∩ int(R) = ∅
}
⇒ Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) ⊂ ∂R (33)
Similarly, by consideringw1,w2, z2, we conclude that there exists
line segments Line(w ′1,w ′′1 ) ⊂ Ray(w1,θk +π ) and Line(w ′2,w ′′2 ) ⊂
Ray(v2,θk + π ) are elements of G and satisfy:
Line(w ′1,w ′′1 ) ⊂ ∂R, Line(w ′2,w ′′2 ) ⊂ ∂R (34)
It follows from Euclidean geometry that any polygon in R2 can
have at maximum two edges that are “parallel”. It also follows
from (32)-(34) that Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ), Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ), Line(w ′1,w ′′1 ), and
Line(w ′2,w ′′2 ) are edges of R. However, it follows from the defini-
tions of the four line segments that they are subsets of rays that
share the same angle, and hence they are all parallel. Hence we
conclude that Line(v ′1,v ′′1 ) = Line(w ′1,w ′′1 ) and Line(v ′2,v ′′2 ) =
Line(w ′2,w ′′2 ) from which it is direct to conclude that (v1,v2) =(w1,w2), a contradiction.
□
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4
Proof. Property (1) follows from Proposition 4.3 where (2) fol-
lows from Lemma 4.2. The complexity of the partitioning follows
from the plane-sweep algorithm whose complexity is established
in Theorem 2.4 in [42]. □
D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.4 that the LiDAR imaging
is affine and the partitions R are convex and hence the encoding
in (15)-(23) is indeed monotone SMC. The result then holds as a
consequence of the correctness of the SMC decision procedure
used to solve (15)-(23) which in turns entails the correctness of
computing δF . □
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